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The “Foreign Domestic Helpers Case”: 
The Relevance of the NPCSC Interpretation 




One of the issues raised by the Vallejos case (the Foreign Domestic Helpers 
Case) is to what extent, if any, the fundamental legal issues which the court was 
called upon to decide in this case had already been dealt with by the National 
People’s Congress Standing Committee when it issued its fi rst Interpretation 
of the Basic Law in June 1999. This article discusses the relevance to this case 
of the 1999 Interpretation and the Preparatory Committee’s Opinion which 
it referred to. It suggests that these documents enable us to have a better and 
fuller understanding of the legislative intent behind Art 24(2) of the Basic Law. 
Such legislative intent is consistent with, and converges with, the common 
understanding of the Chinese and British Governments of the intent behind the 
relevant provisions in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 that correspond 
to Art 24(2). The intent was to set out the basic principles governing permanent 
resident status and right of abode in the HKSAR, and to confer on the legislature 
of the HKSAR a broad power and a wide margin of appreciation in implementing 
and elaborating such basic principles by more detailed legislative rules. 
Introduction
The decision of Hong  Kong’s Court of First Instance in Vallejos 
Evangeline Banao v Commissioner of Registration1 (“the Foreign Domestic 
Helpers Case” or “the FDH Case”) has been the subject of much public 
attention in Hong Kong since the summer of 2011. One of the issues 
raised by the case is to what extent, if any, the fundamental legal issues 
which the court was called upon to decide in this case had already been 
dealt with by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee 
(NPCSC) when it issued its fi rst Interpretation of the Basic Law in June 
∗ Chan Professor in Constitutional Law, University of Hong Kong; Member, Hong Kong Basic 
Law Committee of the NPCSC. This article is an expanded version of the author’s article, “FDH 
Case & 1999 NPCSC Interpretation”, China Daily (Hong Kong edition), 18 October 2011, 
p H31. The author is grateful to the anonymous reviewer whose comments have contributed to 
the improvement of the manuscript.
1 HCAL 124/2010, [2011] HKEC 1289 (30 Sept 2011; Lam J).
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1999 (the 1999 Interpretation).2 In this comment, I will focus on the 
1999 Interpretation, the Preparatory Committee’s Opinion which it 
referred to and their relevance to the FDH Case. 
The 1999 Interpretation
The exact title of the 1999 Interpretation is “the Interpretation by the 
NPCSC of Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the HKSAR”. 
Articles  22(4) and 24(2)(3) were the Basic Law provisions that were 
litigated before and interpreted by the Hong Kong courts in the Ng Ka 
Ling3 and Chan Kam Nga4 cases. Mr Tung Chee-hwa, Chief Executive 
of the HKSAR at the time, requested the NPCSC to interpret these 
provisions after the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) rendered its judgments 
in the Ng and Chan cases in January 1999.5 
Although the text of the 1999 Interpretation is mainly about 
Arts 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law, there is one crucial passage (the 
Relevant Passage) in the Interpretation that has a broader signifi cance. 
The passage reads as follows:
“The legislative intent as stated by this Interpretation, together with the 
legislative intent of all other categories of Article 24(2) of the Basic Law 
of the HKSAR of the PRC, have been refl ected in the ‘Opinions on the 
Implementation of Article 24(2) of the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the 
PRC’ adopted at the 4th Plenary Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for 
the HKSAR of the NPC on 10 August 1996.” 
In the above passage, “all other categories of Art 24(2)” refer to the various 
limbs or paragraphs of Art 24(2) other than para 3 of Art 24(2). Paragraph 
3 is about the permanent resident status (ie right of abode in Hong Kong) 
of mainland-born children of Hong  Kong permanent residents (ie the 
subject litigated in the Ng and Chan cases). The other paragraphs are 
on matters such as the right of abode in Hong  Kong of children born 
in Hong Kong of pregnant women from mainland visiting Hong Kong 
2 Government of the HKSAR Gazette Extraordinary, Legal Supplement No 2, 28 June 1999, 
p  1577 (LN 167 of 1999). The relevant part of this interpretation was cited in para 10 of 
Lam J’s judgment in the present case. 
3 (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4.
4 (1999) 2 HKCFAR 82.
5 See generally Johannes Chan et al (eds), Hong  Kong’s Constitutional Debate (Hong  Kong 
University Press, 2000). 
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(see para 1 – the subject litigated in the Chong Fung Yuen6 case in 2001) 
and foreign nationals who have been ordinarily resident in Hong Kong 
for seven years and have taken Hong Kong as their place of permanent 
residence (see para 4 – the subject litigated in the present FDH Case). 
The Relevant Passage in the 1999 Interpretation thus suggests that 
the legislative intent behind all the right of abode provisions in Art 24(2) 
of the Basic Law has been refl ected in the Preparatory Committee’s 
Opinions of August 1996 (the PC Opinion). What, then, is the PC 
Opinion, and what is meant by saying that it refl ects the legislative 
intent behind Art 24(2)? 
The Preparatory Committee
The Preparatory Committee (PC) was established in 1996 by the NPC in 
accordance with a decision of the NPC in April 1990, which was enacted 
at the same time as the enactment of the Basic Law itself. The Decision 
stated that the PC was responsible for preparing the establishment of the 
HKSAR. The PC enacted various measures which were fundamental to 
the handover process in 1997.7 For example, it enacted the method for 
electing the fi rst Chief Executive of the HKSAR. It decided to establish the 
Provisional Legislative Council and enacted the method for constituting 
it. It made recommendations on the implementation of the Chinese 
Nationality Law in the HKSAR and on the treatment of HK’s existing 
laws for the purpose of the 1997 transition. These recommendations 
were accepted by the NPCSC and incorporated into its Interpretation in 
1996 of the Chinese Nationality Law and its Decision in February 1997 
on the Treatment of HK’s Existing Laws under Art 160 of the Basic Law. 
The PC also issued the PC Opinion on the implementation of Art 24(2) 
of the Basic Law.8 The Provisional Legislative Council of the HKSAR 
amended the existing Immigration Ordinance in accordance with the 
PC Opinion.9 Several key provisions in the amended ordinance were the 
6 (2001) 4 HKCFAR 211 (CFA), [2000] 3 HKLRD 661 (CA), [2000] 1 HKC 359 (CFI, Stock J). 
7 See generally Albert H.Y. Chen, “Legal Preparation for the Establishment of the Hong Kong 
SAR” (1997) 27 HKLJ 405. 
8 The Chinese text of the Opinion and its English translation have been published in The 
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China and 
Related Documents (中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法及相關文件) (Hong Kong: Joint 
Publishing (三聯書店), 2007), pp 91 and 234 respectively. 
9 Immigration (Amendment) (No 2) Ordinance 1997 (Ord No 122 of 1997). See also Immigration 
(Amendment) (No 3) Ordinance 1997 (Ord No 124 of 1997). 
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subjects of constitutional challenge in cases like Ng, Chan and Chong 
mentioned above and in the present FDH Case. 
The Preparatory Committee’s Opinion
The text of the PC Opinion begins as follows:
“Paragraph 2 of Article 24 of the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC 
provides for issues concerning permanent residents of the HKSAR. For 
the purpose of implementing the provisions, the following opinions are 
hereby provided for the reference of HKSAR to formulate the details of the 
implementation rules.”10 
This opening paragraph is then followed by seven sections which deal 
with various aspects of the determination and acquisition of permanent 
resident status and the right of abode in the HKSAR. For example, s 1 
covers the issue litigated in the Chong case. Section 2 deals with the issue 
litigated in the present FDH Case. Section 4 deals with the issue litigated 
in the Chan case and directly covered by the 1999 Interpretation. All 
these are very important provisions. If the CFA in the Chan case had 
accepted the validity of s 4, the reference to the NPCSC in 1999 would 
have been unnecessary. If the CFA in the Chong case had accepted 
the validity of s 1,11 the subsequent problem of the increasing infl ux of 
pregnant women from mainland coming to Hong Kong to give birth to 
their babies would not have existed. And if the court in the present FDH 
Case can be persuaded to accept the validity of s 2, it would uphold the 
restrictions imposed by the existing Immigration Ordinance12 on foreign 
domestic helpers’ eligibility for the acquisition of permanent resident 
status. 
So far, the Hong Kong courts have never accepted the PC Opinion 
as an authoritative guide to the interpretation of Art 24(2) of the Basic 
Law. It is true that the PC was not authorised to interpret the Basic 
Law. Neither did it purport to make an interpretation of the Basic Law, 
10 This English translation of the relevant passage in the PC Opinion comes from The Basic Law 
(n 8 above), p 234. 
11 The CFA rendered its judgment in the Chong case on 20 July 2001. On 21 July 2001, a spokesman 
for the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPCSC stated that the CFA’s decision was “not 
consistent” with the NPCSC’s interpretation of the Basic Law, and “expressed concern” about 
the matter. The relevant interpretation is that of 1999, in which the Relevant Passage affi rms 
the PC Opinion. See generally Albert H.Y. Chen, “Another Case of Confl ict Between the CFA 
and the NPC Standing Committee?” (2001) 31 HKLJ 179.
12 See s 2(4)(a)(vi) of the Ordinance.
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as the opening paragraph of the PC Opinion suggests that the PC was 
only making recommendations to the HKSAR authorities on how to 
formulate detailed rules for the implementation of Art  24(2). This, 
however, should not be the end of the matter as far as the PC Opinion is 
concerned. The PC Opinion should not be disregarded. On the contrary, 
in the light of the 1999 Interpretation and the Relevant Passage in it, the 
PC Opinion deserves to be taken more seriously. 
Taking the Preparatory Committee’s Opinion Seriously
The PC Opinion, when read as a whole, shows that in the opinion of the 
PC, Art 24(2) only lays down the basic principles governing permanent 
resident status and the right of abode in the HKSAR; these basic principles 
are to be implemented by more detailed rules which may be and should 
be enacted by the legislature of the HKSAR.13 In the opinion of the PC, 
the enactment into law of the provisions in ss 1–7 of the PC Opinion 
is within the power of the HKSAR legislature; the enactment of such 
provisions would not be inconsistent with Art 24(2) or the legislative 
intent behind it. 
The Legislative Intent behind Article 24(2) 
The legislative intent behind Art 24(2) as understood by the PC must 
have been that Art 24(2) was intended to lay down the basic principles 
governing permanent resident status and the right of abode in the 
HKSAR; these basic principles are not completely self-executing but 
may be and should be implemented by more detailed rules to be enacted 
by the HKSAR legislature. It was intended that the legislature should 
enjoy a broad power and a wide “margin of appreciation” in making 
such detailed rules for the purpose of implementing the basic principles 
in Art 24(2), and that such detailed rules may elaborate and refi ne the 
broad and general principles in Art 24(2). This would explain why, in 
the opinion of the PC, the recommendations it made in ss 1–7 of the PC 
Opinion, if enacted into law by the HKSAR legislature, would not be 
inconsistent with Art 24(2) or the legislative intent behind it. 
13 This was also the view expressed by Ms Elsie Leung, Secretary for Justice designate, when she 
spoke to move the second reading of the Immigration (Amendment) (No 3) Bill 1997 before 
the Provisional Legislative Council on 7 June 1997. The relevant part of her speech was quoted 
in para 61 of the judgment in the present FDH Case. 
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If this reading of the PC Opinion is correct, and if the PC’s 
understanding of Art 24(2) or the legislative intent behind it is correct, 
then a court engaged in the task of reviewing the constitutionality of 
legislation that was enacted to implement Art  24(2) should accord 
a considerable degree of judicial deference to, or a wide margin of 
appreciation to, the legislature that enacted such legislation. This would 
mean that such legislation should not be subjected to the strict scrutiny 
that is appropriate for the review of legislation that restricts human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. Legislation enacted to implement Art 24(2) 
should only be struck down if it is arbitrary, irrational or so unreasonable 
that no reasonable and responsible legislature implementing Art 24(2) 
in good faith would enact it,14 or it gives a provision in this Article “a 
meaning which the language cannot bear”.15 The court should be slow 
in substituting its own judgment for that of the legislature in situations 
covered by Art  24(2) where reasonable differences in judgment and 
interpretation may legitimately exist.16 In the context of the present FDH 
Case, the proper question for the court should be whether it was arbitrary, 
irrational or beyond the limits of reasonable judgment or determinations 
14 An argument along these lines was put forward before the court in the present FDH Case 
by Lord Pannick QC, acting on behalf of the HKSAR Government. See paras 72 and 158 
of the judgment. The learned judge’s response is as follows (para 159 of the judgment): “It 
is not open for the court to say: simply because the language in the Basic Law is ambiguous 
there could be room for clarifi cation by the IO [Immigration Ordinance]; and so long as the 
provision in the IO is reasonable in the public law sense or proportionate, the court would not 
intervene. That would in substance be delegated legislation.” With respect, the key question is 
precisely whether, as a matter of the true construction of Art 24(2)(4) of the Basic Law, it was 
intended that the HKSAR legislature should be authorised to elaborate and refi ne the meaning 
of “ordinarily resided” in Art 24(2)(4) by enacting legislation. 
15 Director of Immigration v Chong Fung Yuen [2001] 2 HKLRD 533 at 546 (per Li CJ).
16 In the present FDH Case, Lam J adopted the approach of Stock J’s (as he then was) in the Court 
of First Instance in the Chong case (discussed in para 129 of Lam J’s judgment): “the issue is: 
taking the purpose and the context of Article 24(2)(4) into account, should its reference to 
ordinarily residence be construed as subject to the authority given to the Hong Kong legislature 
to enact provisions like the Impugned Provision excluding certain categories of persons ... ? To 
a common lawyer applying the common law approach of interpretation, I can readily see the 
attraction in the judgment of Stock J in Chong Fung Yuen, viz. the Basic Law is not merely 
some generalization to the local legislature as to the path that might be taken; instead it 
defi nes who shall have the status of permanent resident and there cannot be any derogation of 
it by local legislation.” (para 138 of Lam J’s judgment; emphasis supplied) The learned judge 
concluded that “the Impugned Provision, by excluding the FDHs as a class from the benefi t 
of Article 24(2)(4), derogates instead of clarifi es the meaning of that Article.” (para 175; emphasis 
supplied) With respect, whether the Impugned Provision “derogates from the requirements 
of the Basic Law” (to use Stock J’s language in Chong Fung Yuen [2000] 1 HKC 359 at 376) 
depends on how the term “ordinarily resided” in Art 24(2)(4) is interpreted. If this term can 
reasonably accommodate more than one meaning or interpretation (say, interpretations A 
and B), then neither interpretations A nor B derogate from the Basic Law provision. The 
“deference” or “margin of appreciation” advocated here means that insofar as the term can 
reasonably sustain interpretations A and B, the court should not strike down interpretation B 
(the approach adopted by the legislature) as a derogation from the requirements of the Basic 
Law simply because the court itself prefers interpretation A. 
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for the legislature to have arrived at a legislative judgment that by virtue 
of the peculiar features of the FDH labour import scheme,17 FDHs should 
not be regarded as “ordinarily resident” in Hong Kong.18 In answering this 
question, it would not be appropriate for the court to accord overriding 
constitutional force in Hong Kong to the decision of any particular English 
court on the interpretation of the term “ordinarily resident” in a UK Act 
of Parliament and thus to constrain unduly the HKSAR legislature in this 
regard.19 
17 See para 68 of the judgment in the present case.
18 Immigration Ordinance, s 2(4)(a)(vi).
19 Both the CFA in the previous cases of Fateh Muhammad (2001) 4 HKCFAR 278 and Prem 
Singh (2003) 6 HKCFAR 26 and Lam J in the present FDH Case regarded the House of Lords’ 
decision in R v Barnet London Borough Council, Ex p Shah [1983] 2 AC 309 (the Shah case) as 
highly authoritative for the purpose of the interpretation of the meaning of “ordinarily resided” 
in Art 24(2)(4) of the Basic Law. It is questionable whether the House of Lords’ interpretation 
in the Shah case of the term “ordinarily resident” as used in the Education Act 1962 and its 
subsidiary legislation should be given overriding constitutional force in the HKSAR, so as to 
trump any different legislative judgment reached by the HKSAR legislature as regards whether 
a particular category of persons (such as FDHs, or other categories of persons provided for 
in s 2(4)(a) of the Immigration Ordinance, such as refugees, contract workers who come to 
Hong Kong under an “importation of labour scheme”, foreign consular offi cials, members of 
the Chinese military force, or Chinese cadres sent by the mainland government to work in 
Hong Kong) should be regarded as “ordinarily resident” in Hong Kong (having regard to the 
particular features of the scheme or policy under which such persons have been allowed entry 
into Hong Kong). This approach (of giving overriding constitutional force to the House of 
Lords’ decision in the Shah case) is questionable for at least two reasons. First, the Shah case 
was decided in the context of the interpretation of a UK statute rather than a constitutional 
instrument. In the UK, Parliament always has, and has from time to time exercised, the power 
to legislate to elaborate, refi ne or adjust the meaning of “ordinarily resident” in different 
legislative contexts and for different purposes, usually by exclusionary provisions that provide 
that residence in certain specifi ed circumstances is not considered “ordinarily resident” in the 
UK. (See, eg, National Service Act 1948, s 34(4); Visiting Forces Act 1952, s 12(3); Immigration 
Act 1971, s 33(2). It is noteworthy that after the House of Lords’ decision in the Shah case, the 
practical effect of the decision (in terms of foreign students’ eligibility for grants for university 
study) was reversed by an amendment to reg 13(1)(a) of the Education (Mandatory Awards) 
Regulations 1982: see R v Hereford and Worcester County Council, Ex p Wimbourne (CO/174/83; 
Queen’s Bench Division, 8 Nov 1983).) The legislature of colonial Hong Kong also had, and 
had from time to time exercised, a power similar to that of the UK Parliament to legislate 
to elaborate or refi ne the meaning of “ordinarily resident”: see, eg, the legislative history of s 
2(4) of the Immigration Ordinance. It is highly doubtful whether the intention behind the 
relevant provision of the Joint Declaration (on the right of abode in the HKSAR of foreign 
nationals ordinarily resident in Hong Kong) and the corresponding provision in Art 24 of the 
Basic Law was that the House of Lords’ interpretation of the term “ordinarily resident” in a 
UK statute should constrain and fetter the legislative judgment and discretion of the HKSAR 
legislature even though it constrains and fetters neither the UK Parliament nor the colonial 
Hong Kong legislature. The better view is that the intention behind the relevant provisions 
in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law was that the existing system (at the time of the 
conclusion of the Joint Declaration and the enactment of the Basic Law) should be maintained 
whereby the Hong Kong legislature had a broad power to defi ne, refi ne, elaborate or adjust 
the meaning of “ordinarily resident” by exclusionary provisions or otherwise. This view would 
be consistent with the general theme in the Basic Law of continuity of existing systems and 
policies. Secondly, a reading of the judgments of the Divisional Court ([1980] 3 All ER 679) 
and of the Court of Appeal ([1982] 1 All ER 698) (both of which rendered judgments contrary 
to the House of Lords’ decision in the same case) in the Shah case would reveal that at the time 
of the Shah case, several varying interpretations of the term “ordinarily resident” co-existed 
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Back to the 1999 Interpretation
Is the above understanding of the legislative intent behind Art 24(2) 
accurate and sound? I think several factors are relevant in this regard. 
First, the 1999 Interpretation has already, in the Relevant Passage, 
affi rmed the validity of the PC’s understanding of the legislative intent 
behind Art 24(2). Even if, as decided by the CFA in the Chong case, 
the Relevant Passage does not constitute a binding interpretation of 
the NPCSC on all the various limbs of Art 24(2),20 there is no reason 
why the Relevant Passage should not be recognised as having persuasive 
authority.21 Secondly, the PC’s work has received the endorsement of the 
in UK law, and the interpretation adopted by the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal 
differed from that fi nally adopted by the House of Lords. In particular, the Court of Appeal’s 
interpretation took into account and gave considerable weight to the purpose for which the 
relevant persons (who claimed that they were ordinarily resident in the UK) were initially 
allowed entry into the UK, the terms and conditions upon which they were allowed entry, their 
immigration status and related policy considerations. If the Court of Appeal’s approach in the 
Shah case were to be adopted by the HKSAR court, it is much more likely that the impugned 
provision in the FDH Case would be upheld. Since the House of Lords’ interpretation in the 
Shah case of “ordinarily resident” in a UK statute is binding on neither the HKSAR court 
nor the HKSAR legislature for the purpose of Art 24(2) of the Basic Law, it would not be 
appropriate or legitimate for an HKSAR court to require, or to impose a constitutional mandate 
on, the HKSAR legislature to follow the House of Lords’ approach (to the interpretation of 
“ordinarily resident”) in preference to that of the English Court of Appeal in the Shah case. 
From the perspective of the constitutional law of the HKSAR or the intention behind the 
relevant provisions in the Joint Declaration and Art 24(2) of the Basic Law, making a choice 
between these two approaches should surely be within the margin of discretion or margin of 
appreciation of the HKSAR legislature. 
20 See paras 11–14 of the judgment in the present FDH Case.
21 In Chong (n 6 above), the Government conceded that the 1999 Interpretation did not 
constitute a binding interpretation of Art 24(2)(1) of the Basic Law (ie the provision which 
the court had to interpret in Chong), and the CFA decided the case on this basis: see [2001] 2 
HKLRD 533 at 545, 553, 555–556. However, the CFA did not state in its judgment to what 
extent, if any, the Relevant Passage in the 1999 Interpretation may be accorded persuasive 
authority. Two considerations should be relevant in this regard. First, the Relevant Passage and 
the PC Opinion it referred to may constitute post-enactment extrinsic materials (ie materials 
that came into existence after the enactment of the Basic Law in 1990) that may “throw light 
on the context or purpose of the Basic Law or its particular provisions” (ibid. p 546). In Chong, 
the CFA held that it was not necessary “to explore what assistance (if any) can be derived 
from extrinsic materials other than pre-enactment materials relating to context and purpose” 
(ibid. p 547), because the meaning of the Basic Law provision being interpreted in this case was 
clear and unambiguous. The CFA thus left open the possibility of reference to and reliance on 
post-enactment material where the meaning of the relevant Basic Law provision is ambiguous, 
although it also pointed out that in any event, such material should be approached “cautiously”; 
a “prudent approach” is called for (ibid. p 547). Secondly, the common law practice of according 
high persuasive authority to obiter dicta in the decisions of the House of Lords (or the present 
Supreme Court) may be understood as being based on the principle that the opinion of a body 
that has the supreme authority to interpret the law should be accorded persuasive authority 
even if it is not binding because it does not address directly the issues raised by the case which 
the court is hearing. As the NPCSC has the supreme authority to interpret the Basic Law under 
Art 158 of the Basic Law, according persuasive authority to an obiter dictum in an interpretation 
issued by it under Art 158 would be consistent with this principle. 
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NPC itself when it passed a resolution on the subject in March 1997.22 
Thirdly, support for the PC’s view can be found in the legislative history 
of Art  24(2), particularly the Joint Declaration and the negotiations 
between the Chinese and British Governments on the implementation 
of the right of abode provisions in the Joint Declaration.23 This third 
point may be elaborated as follows.24 
The Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 
The text of Art 24(2) of the Basic Law is by no means original. It was 
not invented by the Basic Law Drafting Committee; instead it was 
almost completely duplicated from the fi rst paragraph of Section XIV of 
Annex I to the Joint Declaration (JD). This close relationship or direct 
link between the right of abode provisions in the JD and the Basic Law, 
or what I would call the “Duplication Phenomenon”, is highly relevant 
to the understanding of the legislative intent behind Art 24(2) for two 
reasons. 
First, it is not diffi cult to understand that when the fi rst paragraph 
of Section XIV of Annex I (the Relevant JD Provisions) was drafted, 
it was most probably not intended to be used as the text of a written 
constitution that serves as the basis or yardstick for constitutional 
judicial review of legislation and for strict scrutiny of relevant legislation 
in this regard. The Relevant JD Provisions were drafted in 1983–84, and 
it would not have been possible at the time to consider in detail and to 
resolve satisfactorily all the complex issues that would arise in the course 
of the precise delineation of the categories of persons who were to be 
given the right of abode in the future HKSAR. (Indeed, the very concept 
of the right of abode was novel and did not exist in Hong Kong law at 
the time the JD was concluded.25) Thus the most which the Chinese and 
British Governments could do in the Relevant JD Provisions would be 
22 For the English translation of the resolution, see Chen (n 7 above), p 424.
23 The relevant information on these matters has been summarised in the judgment in the present 
FDH Case. 
24 Actually, this argument based on the Joint Declaration and the Sino-British negotiations may 
be independently relied on to establish the legislative intent behind Art 24(2) of the Basic 
Law, irrespective of whether an HKSAR court adopting the common law approach to the 
interpretation of the Basic Law should rely on the 1999 Interpretation and the PC Opinion in 
circumstances where they are not binding. I am grateful to this Journal’s anonymous reviewer 
for drawing my attention to this point. 
25 See generally Albert H.Y. Chen, “The Development of Immigration Law and Policy: The 
Hong Kong Experience” (1988) 33 McGill LJ 631.
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to set out the basic principles, and to leave to the future the questions 
and tasks of their implementation, which would necessarily include the 
enactment of more detailed rules. 
The Basic Law Drafting Committee 
The drafting of the Basic Law could have been the opportunity for 
the basic principles in the Relevant JD Provisions to be elaborated, 
refi ned and concretised. However, the Basic Law Drafting Committee 
ultimately decided not to tamper with the Relevant JD Provisions, but to 
reproduce them in Art 24(2) of the Basic Law almost verbatim. In this 
regard, the draftsmen of the Basic Law cannot be faulted for the faithful 
implementation of the JD. If the PC – whose members included many 
of the members of the Basic Law Drafting Committee – was right in 
understanding the legislative intent behind Art 24(2), it was in any event 
open for the HKSAR legislature to elaborate and refi ne the provisions of 
Art 24(2) in the course of their implementation. There would therefore 
be no harm in leaving Art 24(2) simple and simply copying the text of 
the Relevant JD Provisions into it.
Treaty and International Law
Now I turn to the second legal implication of the Duplication 
Phenomenon, which entails that the interpretation of Art  24(2) and 
its legislative intent cannot be divorced from the interpretation of the 
Relevant JD Provisions and the intent of the two governments that agreed 
to them. According to international law, where a treaty is made between 
two states, then the governments of the two states have the right to 
interpret the provisions of the treaty in the course of its implementation,26 
because they understand best their own intentions when they agreed to 
particular provisions in the treaty; any relevant agreement between, or 
practice or conduct of, the governments subsequent to the conclusion 
of the treaty may throw light on how the treaty should be interpreted.27 
26 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn 2008), p 630: “Obviously the parties 
have competence to interpret a treaty, but this is subject to the operation of other rules of the 
law.”
27 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Art 31. Article 31(3)(a) and (b) provide as 
follows: “There shall be taken into account [for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty], 
together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice 
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Sino-British Negotiations
In the case of the Relevant JD Provisions, there is ample evidence28 
that ever since the conclusion of the JD, the Chinese and British 
Governments had engaged in negotiations, mainly under the auspices 
of the Joint Liaison Group set up under the JD, on how the Relevant JD 
Provisions should be implemented and elaborated by domestic legislation 
in Hong Kong. On the basis of such negotiations, consensus was reached 
on various relevant issues, and during the transition years leading 
up to 1997, some amendments to the existing immigration law were 
introduced by the colonial legislature in pursuance of such consensus. 
Immediately after the handover, further amendments – including the 
amendment relating to foreign domestic helpers that was challenged in 
the present case – were made by the HKSAR legislature, again on the 
basis of the consensus reached between the two governments regarding 
the implementation of the Relevant JD Provisions.
The Common View of the Two Governments
The conduct of the two governments in engaging in continuous 
negotiations and reaching consensus during the transition period of 
1984–1997 on the precise legislative details of the implementation of the 
Relevant JD Provisions by domestic legislation in colonial Hong Kong 
and in the HKSAR demonstrates unequivocally that in the common 
view of the two governments, the Relevant JD Provisions merely provide 
basic principles which are subject to elaboration and refi nement in the 
course of their implementation by more detailed domestic legislation. 
The relevant conduct also indicates that in the common view of the 
two governments, the consensus solutions or measures they agreed to 
in the course of the negotiations on various issues that arose in the 
course of the implementation of the Relevant JD Provisions were 
consistent with the Relevant JD Provisions and the intent behind it, 
and were by no means a breach of the Relevant JD Provisions.29 Insofar 
in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation”. See also Art 31(4) (A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established 
that the parties so intended) and Art 32 (on having recourse to, inter alia, “the circumstances 
of” the conclusion of the treaty). Article 31 was considered by the CFA in Ng Ka Ling (1999) 
2 HKCFAR 4 at 41–42. See also paras 73 and 121 of the judgment in the present FDH Case. 
28 As summarised in the judgment in the present FDH Case.
29 In the context of the present FDH Case, the relevant consensus was evidenced by a statement 
made by the Director of Immigration to the Legislative Council Security Panel on 14  Apr 
1997 (when Hong Kong was still under British rule) and a booklet on “Right of Abode in 
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as such consensus was partly to be implemented by legislation made by 
the HKSAR legislature, it is fair to say that the two governments both 
understood the Relevant JD Provisions – and hence the almost identical 
provisions in Art 24(2) of the Basic Law – as having conferred on the 
HKSAR legislature a broad power and a wide margin of appreciation 
for the purpose of implementing and elaborating the Relevant JD 
Provisions, including the power to legislate to implement the consensus 
solutions or measures mentioned above.30 Indeed, given the Duplication 
Phenomenon, a court striking down as unconstitutional any legislation 
that was based on the consensus reached by the two governments on 
the implementation of the Relevant JD Provisions would in effect be 
implying that the two governments had conspired to act in breach of the 
Relevant JD Provisions. 
Conclusion
In the course of the present litigation in the FDH Case, the 1999 
Interpretation of the NPCSC and the PC Opinion affi rmed by this 
Interpretation deserve to be taken seriously. Taking the PC Opinion 
seriously will enable us to have a better and fuller understanding of the 
the Hong  Kong Special Administrative Region” published by the Immigration Department 
in Apr 1997: see para 60 of the judgment in the present case. According to the Director of 
Immigration’s LegCo statement of 14 Apr 1997, “In past discussions with the Chinese side, we 
[the British / Hong Kong side] have reached a large measure of agreement on the interpretation 
of Article 24 of the Basic Law and the implementation arrangements. … The interpretations 
agreed are summarised as follows … With regard to persons not of Chinese nationality … 
apart from contract workers under the Government Importation of Labour schemes, illegal 
immigrants, detainees and refugees, imported domestic helpers will also not be regarded as 
ordinarily resident in Hong Kong”. 
30 In the context of the present FDH Case, the two governments must have understood the 
provision in Section XIV of Annex I to the Joint Declaration providing for the right of 
abode in the HKSAR of foreign nationals “who have ordinarily resided in Hong  Kong … 
for a continuous period of 7 years or more and who have taken Hong  Kong as their place 
of permanent residence” to mean that the HKSAR legislature has a broad power or a wide 
margin of discretion to defi ne, elaborate or refi ne the meaning of “ordinary residence” for 
this purpose (by exclusionary provisions (applicable to particular categories of persons) or 
otherwise), just as both the colonial legislature in Hong Kong and the UK Parliament had, 
at the time of the conclusion of the Joint Declaration, the power to do so for the purposes of 
Hong Kong and UK law respectively (which power they had indeed exercised from time to 
time in different contexts and for different purposes). It could not have been the intention of 
the two governments, when they agreed to this provision in the Joint Declaration, that the 
power or competence of the HKSAR legislature in this regard should be fettered by a particular 
interpretation given to the term “ordinarily resident” in a UK statute in a particular case such as 
the House of Lords’ decision in the Shah case, or that the two governments should be deprived 
of the competence to enter into a subsequent agreement (lawfully and without acting in breach 
of the Joint Declaration) to implement this provision like the subsequent agreement that was 
actually reached with regard to the implementation of this provision in the case of foreign 
domestic helpers. See also n 19 above. 
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legislative intent behind Art  24(2) of the Basic Law. Such legislative 
intent is consistent with, and converges with, the common understanding 
of the Chinese and British Governments of the intent behind the 
Relevant JD Provisions that correspond to Art  24(2). The intent of 
both Art 24(2) and the Relevant JD Provisions was to set out the basic 
principles governing permanent resident status and right of abode in the 
HKSAR, and to confer on the legislature of the HKSAR a broad power 
and a wide margin of appreciation in implementing and elaborating such 
basic principles by more detailed legislative rules. 
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